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Impact of public procurement aggregation on competition.  
Risks, rationale and justification for the rules in Directive 2014/24 
Dr Albert Sanchez-Graells1 and Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui2 
I. Introduction 
Purchasing aggregation strategies have proven to be a popular,3 and arguably efficient, tool when 
procuring public goods or services to achieve best-value for money. In particular aggregation 
techniques such as central purchasing bodies, framework agreements, dynamic purchasing 
systems, electronic catalogues and auctions have been widely used and of increasing importance 
in procurement practice. This tendency has been recognized in recital (59) of Directive 2014/24, 
as “[t]here is a strong trend emerging across Union public procurement markets towards the 
aggregation of demand by public purchasers, with a view to obtaining economies of scale, 
including lower prices and transaction costs, and to improving and professionalising 
procurement management.”4 Such popularity made aggregated procurement techniques to be 
chosen as one of the focus areas of the newly adopted 2014 public procurement directives.5 This 
chapter aims at discussing what are the economic and administrative benefits, consequences, 
risks and challenges posed by strategies of aggregated purchasing vis-à-vis the status quo of 
decentralized competitive processes in public procurement.  
Our discussion is focused on a European-wide perspective in an interdisciplinary manner by 
combining macro and microeconomic theory with the legal discussion. The chapter is limited to 
aggregated purchasing techniques within the scope of the still current Public Sector Directive 
2004/18 and the new rules in Directive 2014/24. This, however, does not preclude extrapolating 
the conclusions herewith presented to procurement activities under the 2004/17 and 2004/25 
Utilities and 2014/23 Concessions Directives, with some minor adjustments.  
We submit that, if properly employed, aggregated procurement strategies can be effective tools 
for reaping the benefits of intense competition in tender procedures. This should translate into 
better prices, terms and conditions and quality for contracting authorities and ultimately end 
users and tax payers. The regulatory constraints generated by aggregated purchasing and the 
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3 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2012: 25); OECD (2011); PUBLIC PROCUREMENT NETWORK (2010); and 
ibid, (2009). This has been recognised in rec (69) of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 February 2014 on Public Procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L 94/65 
(hereinafter, the “Directive 2014/24” or “dir 2014/24”). 
4 Rec (59) dir 2014/24. 
5 The instruments and tools for aggregated procurement are regulated in Chapter II of dir 2014/24. For a review to 
the changes introduced in the new directives see, inter alia, RISVIG HAMER (2014) in totum. 
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buying power that they allow central purchasing bodies to exercise vis-à-vis economic operators 
can, however, also thwart the competitive process and constitute breaches of EU competition law 
as consequence of the unavoidable abuse of a dominant purchasing position (art 102 TFEU), or 
even of anticompetitive agreements (art 101 TFEU). We also submit that the ‘public service’ 
exemption is unavailable because centralised purchasing activities cannot be properly configured 
as a service of general economic interest (SGEI, art 106(2) TFEU), which triggers State aid risks 
(art 107(1) TFEU). Thus, adopting aggregated purchasing strategies demands awareness of their 
implications and the employment of mechanisms to avoid undesired legal, administrative and 
economic consequences.  
Furthermore, we advance that the current regulation of the existing aggregated procurement 
strategies raises consistency and coherence problems with the rest of public procurement 
regulation and in particular the principle of competition embedded in article 18(1) of Directive 
2014/24. Lastly, we put forward that an increasing tendency towards creation of central 
purchasing bodies on national level is likely to be replicated in a supranational level with the 
creation of regional or even European-wide central purchasing bodies. Such centralization 
tendency, however, poses serious risks that ought to be taken into account and that appear to be 
overlooked by legislators and procurement practitioners. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. We firstly explore the justifications advanced for the 
aggregation of purchasing (II) and the countervailing risks it generates (III). In both cases, we 
focus in economic and administrative aspects. We then proceed to a summary overview of the 
new rules for the aggregation of public procurement in Directive 2014/24 (IV) and emphasise 
how the Directive is expressly recognising possibilities that clearly exceed the more modest 
approach in Directive 2004/18. We then focus on the potential justification of certain activities 
now permitted by the 2014 rules and engage in a critical assessment of their competitive impact 
(V). We then briefly focus on the far-reaching and not necessarily positive implications that a 
maximisation of the centralisation and aggregation possibilities under Directive 2014/24 could 
have, and propose that strict competition law enforcement will be necessary to avoid undesired 
consequences (VI). Our conclusions summarise our findings (VII). 
II. Justifications for aggregated purchasing 
Aggregation strategies may grant benefits to direct and indirect participants of public tenders, the 
contracting authorities and taxpayers. Aggregation strategies can generate positive effects over 
the competitive process in the adjudication of public contracts by fostering competition between 
economic operators, lowering purchasing prices, suppressing duplicated procedures, generating 
operational economies of scale and reducing public expenditure with the aim of achieving better 
value for money in public procurement.6 However, it is our view that the benefits potentially 
generated by aggregated purchasing will only take place if competition as a process is truly 
preserved and proper administrative and policy decisions are taken in order to minimize the 
pernicious side effects generated by aggregated purchasing. Thus, the benefits we discuss infra 
                                                          
6 Rec (15) of Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 of March 2004 on the 
Coordination of the Procedures for the Award of Public Works Contracts, Pubic Supply Contracts and Public 
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may only be achieved in aggregation is properly implemented as discussed in detail in sections 
IV and V, so that the risks spelled out in section III are minimised. 
1. Economic benefits  
The economic rationale behind strategies for aggregated purchasing is grounded on the 
accumulation of public purchasing market power by exerting bargaining power7 and the creation 
of bureaucratic economies of scale. 8  Accumulation of public market power is carried out in two 
different ways.9 On the one hand, by employing a single contracting authority that will be 
responsible for making purchases for other contracting authorities, such as is the case with 
central purchasing bodies (CPBs).10 On the other hand, by means of public-public collaboration 
through occasional joint procurement, where two or more contracting authorities either enter into 
an agreement and collectively coordinate their purchases, or engage in minor forms of 
collaboration, such common preparation of tender documentation or entrusting one contracting 
authority with the management of the procedures.11 Additionally, aggregated purchasing 
techniques, in particular centralised purchasing framework agreements or dynamic purchasing 
systems, generate bureaucratic economies of scales as the transaction costs and the total amount 
of tenders is reduced, thus promoting operational efficiency. 
A) Bargaining power 
In economic terms, aggregated purchasing aims at pooling public purchasing market power, in a 
same manner as a purchasing cartel among undertakings seeks to achieve it in order to maximize 
its profits.12 In accordance with microeconomic theory, by adopting purchase aggregation 
strategies contracting authorities acting as a single entity are able to exert buyer power vis-à-vis 
its suppliers and obtain better terms and conditions when entering into public contracts.13 Such 
buyer power, however, can take two different forms: monopsony power and bargaining power.14 
Only aggregated purchasing that fosters the creation of non-abusive bargaining power has sound 
economic justifications. Aggregated purchasing that generates monopsony effects, on the 
contrary, will tend to be inefficient.15 
If aggregated purchasing strategies are successful—ie they lead to the increase of purchasing 
market power, leverage negotiation advantages and increase technical knowledge–bargaining 
power will be generated. Consequently, the buyer will then be a competitive constrain to the 
                                                          
7 CHARD et al. (2008: NA26). 
8 Also supporting this view that aggregated procurement techniques achieves “economies of scale” see CMA (2004: 
paras. 1.43-1.51); RISVIG HAMER (2014: 201). See also rec (59) dir 2014/24. 
9 Somewhat similarly and distinguishing two mechanisms for achieving purchasing aggregation in the healthcare 
sector, see RACCA (2010: 121). 
10 Rec (69) dir 2014/24. 
11 Rec (71) dir 2014/24. 
12 Paradoxically, anti-competitive agreements between competing undertakings are strictly forbidden under EU/EEA 
competition law in accordance with art 101 TFEU. For a discussion, based on US law, see CARSTENSEN (2010).  
13 This would be the case of bargaining power, see OECD (2009: 22). 
14 The term buyer power is used in this contribution as an umbrella term covering both monopsony and bargaining 
power, despite their very different welfare consequences. For a similar use of the term, see inter alia: OECD (2009); 
CHEN (2007). Cf with Noll who uses buyer power as a synonym of monopsony power in NOLL (2004-2005). 
15 CHEN (2007: 28). 
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suppliers and will be able to obtain more favourable terms and conditions than those offered to 
other contracting authorities or undertakings acquiring the same goods or services.16 This, on the 
other hand, presupposes that aggregated purchase strategies are able to neutralize seller market 
power, thus acting as countervailing power.17 This neutralizing force can make competition more 
vigorous by lowering prices paid and passing on the benefits to tax payers in the form of cheaper 
and better quality public services. To realize those benefits, however, the supply side must have 
some previous degree of market power allowing them to charge a price above pure competitive 
levels (ie the price under “perfect” market conditions).18 Otherwise, providers will be unable to 
bring forth better terms and conditions than already offered and will opt for not taking part in the 
tender procedure. In this perspective, bargaining power generated by aggregation techniques acts 
as a countervailing force neutralizing the market power of economic operators and forces them to 
offer the most competitive prices and conditions to contracting authorities. 
However, these benefits generated by bargaining power ought to consider exercising public 
buyer power differs from its exercise by a private entity profit making driven, and therefore, not 
all assumptions hold true in our case.19 Firstly, the public buyer is constrained in its acting by EU 
and national public procurement rules which make exercising buyer power more difficult due to 
compliance with the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and the derived obligation 
of transparency. Tender procedures themselves impair the full exercise of buyer power because 
the contracting authority cannot set a purchasing price. Instead, the price is offered by the 
tenderers. Secondly, buying decision-making of the public sector must take into account other 
variables than in the private sector, such as being more risk-averse, it cannot (or ought not) 
compromise availability of goods or services (particularly when they are directly used in the 
provision of services to the public and where minimum quality standards are applicable) and, by 
and large, tends to be more conservative. Thirdly, contracting authorities do not aim at 
maximizing profits and, consequently, will be less oriented towards exercising buyer power.20  
Summing up the idea, by exercising bargaining power through demand aggregation, contracting 
authorities will be likely to obtain better contractual terms than if they were negotiating only by 
themselves vis-à-vis economic operators. These buyer power derived benefits will be obtained 
only if the market is not fully competitive (ie suppliers hold selling power that is resulting in 
supra-competitive equilibria), the contracting authority is aware of its purchasing power and the 
purchasing tools are employed in a way that does not preclude its exercise. In welfare terms, 
extra profits and inefficiencies generated by supply-side market power are then reduced or 
altogether eliminated. This implies two effects: a welfare distribution between suppliers and 
buyers and overall increase of efficiency and welfare.21 
                                                          
16 CMA (2004: para. 1.10). 
17 CMA (2004: para. 1.16). Countervailing power as a regulatory mechanism was introduced by GALBRAITH. 
18 OECD (2009: 21). 
19 Also recognizing this difference with the private buyer power, see CMA (2004: para. 1.13). 
20 This latter general idea links back to the concept of x-inefficiency in the public sector. This concept was developed 
in the seminal work of LEIBENSTEIN. The concept is broadly accepted, although not by all, and still used in the 
shaping of EU economic policy. See AFONSO et al. (2010). 
21 In this case, arguably, the increase in welfare will be positive regardless of the benchmark standard being that of 
consumer or total welfare. From a pure supplier perspective bargaining power is detrimental because it reduces 
“monopoly profits”. 
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B) “Bureaucratic economics of scale” 
Aggregated purchasing creates bureaucratic economies of scale that foster operational efficiency 
and reduce transaction costs.22 In microeconomic terms, and due to the scale of its operational 
efficiency, aggregated purchasing allows contracting authorities to reduce the overall costs of the 
procurement activities if compared to the situation where contracting authorities would have 
carried out individual purchases. These economies of scale may prove to be one of the main 
reasons behind the rationale of adopting a pro-aggregation policy as they tend to be quite large.23 
Operational efficiency by means of aggregation techniques is achieved in two different ways. 
Firstly, by recourse to centralisation of purchases that would have been carried out individually 
by contracting entities, which pooling together eliminates duplicated procurement procedures. 
Instead of entering into several minor public contracts, aggregation techniques allows the public 
sector to enter into less frequent but much larger and arguably more complex contracts. 
Secondly, by entering into framework agreements or dynamic purchasing systems, operational 
efficiency is obtained as the successive procurement procedures (be they ‘mini-competitions’ or 
direct call-offs) carried out after establishing the system are simplified and streamlined (ie setting 
up the system implies front-loading costs, but the overall operational expenditure is reduced). 
This may significantly reduce the transaction costs for each successive purchase as there is no 
need to run a full tender procedure but instead a much simplified and shorter one. 
C) Sponsoring of new entrants 
Lastly, part of the literature suggests that aggregated purchasing may foster the entrance of new 
suppliers or encourage participation of local and/or regional SMEs into public procurement 
markets particularly by overcoming entry barriers or establishing obligations of exclusive 
purchasing.24 In our opinion, however, such preferential treatment given to new players will 
almost always be in breach of the principles of equal treatment, its derived obligation of 
transparency and the general principle of (undistorted) competition, unless objectively justified 
and capable of overcoming very strict proportionality tests.25 Additionally, such measures may 
constitute granting of unlawful state aid, as the advantages given are of a selective nature.26 
2. Administrative benefits 
Aggregated purchasing strategies may generate other type of efficiencies that by their nature can 
be qualified as administrative, despite the fact they can also be quantified in economic terms. We 
distinguish two main administrative benefits: the professionalization of procurement services and 
the centralization of procedures, which leads to advantages in their control. 
                                                          
22 For some selected works on operational efficiency in the public sector, see: SMITH and MAYSTON (1987); 
RUGGIERO (1996); ANWANDTER and OZUNA (2002); RANTANEN et al. (2007); and AFONSO et al. (2010). 
23 KARJALAINEN (2009). See also SERPYTIS et al. (2011). 
24 CMA (2004: para. 1.26). 
25 Raising a somewhat similar issue, see BURGI (2007: 287). 
26 Art 107 TFEU. See also HEUNINCKX (2009); SANCHEZ GRAELLS (2012a) and (2012b). 
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A) Professionalization of procurement services 
One of the arguably natural consequences of adopting aggregated procurement strategies is the 
professionalization of civil servants that carry out public procurement due to the acquired 
expertise when awarding public contracts in a daily basis,27 as acknowledged by recital (69) of 
Directive 2014/24. Procurement aggregation techniques are carried out usually by a group of 
highly qualified public officers that enter into public contracts on a daily basis. Due to the large 
amount of operations handled by these officers, it is expected that they will be able to 
accumulate expertise in carrying out public procurement procedures.28 Also as clarified by 
Directive 2014/24, central purchasing bodies may carry out ancillary purchasing activities 
allowing them to act as “procurement advisors or trainers” for other contracting authorities, 
further strengthening professionalization of public procurement.29 
The benefits of professionally trained procurement officials are self-evident: skilled procurement 
officials take less time to plan and design tender procedures, are more efficient at conducting 
tender procedures and have a better overall knowledge for administering public contracts. 
Furthermore, professionalization of procurement officers implies that there will be a reduced risk 
of procedural mistakes because these experts will be law-aware and law-abiding, and 
consequently less public procurement litigation. 
B) Control of procedures 
One of the advantages generated by aggregated purchasing is that it grants a larger degree of 
control over the granting and execution phase of public contracts.30 Central purchasing bodies or 
bodies created through ad-hoc public-public collaboration not only carry out purchases, but also 
administer public contracts on behalf of other contracting authorities—such as framework 
agreements or dynamic purchasing systems—draft technical specifications, carry out tasks of 
procurement management, training, contract management, inter alia.31 These bodies, if entrusted 
with general managerial tasks in addition to pure procurement practices, are able to have a 
hands-on control over a large degree of public contracts and their execution as they tend to work 
as coordination bodies for other contracting authorities.  
III. Risks generated by aggregated purchasing 
As acknowledged by Directive 2014/24,32 together with the sorts of benefits we have just 
discussed (above II), aggregated procurement strategies pose risks to public procurement markets 
both in the medium and long term, thus demanding that these instruments are carefully 
monitored to prevent the abuse of public buyer power that would erode the benefits of increased 
competition. In our view, the importance of these risks should be appropriately recognised. 
Aggregation techniques and procurement practices, therefore, should be employed by contracting 
authorities in accordance with the principle of competition embedded in article 18(1) of 
                                                          
27 OECD (2007); ibid (2000). See also STUIJTS et al. (2008). 
28 Rec (69) dir 2014/24. 
29 RISVIG HAMER (2014: 207-208). 
30 RACCA (2010: 120). 
31 Ibid, 121. 
32 Rec (59) dir 2014/24. 
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Directive 2014/24 and with the aim of minimizing these risks whenever entering into public 
contracts. In the following paragraphs we discuss the economic and administrative risks 
generated by aggregated procurement strategies. 
1. Economic risks 
Aggregation of public buyer power and improper employment of aggregation techniques may 
lead to restriction of competition and abuse of public purchasing power vis-à-vis economic 
operators. These situations may take place either by single behaviour or by collusive agreements 
among contracting authorities when designing tender procedures or imposing contracting 
conditions, as recognized by recital (59) of the Directive 2014/24.33  
We argue that aggregated purchasing strategies if not properly employed and monitored may 
cause the following pernicious effects: a) monopsony effect; b) abusive bargaining power; c) 
increase market concentration; d) waterbed effect; e) lack of incentives to innovate; and f) 
increase risk of collusion among tenderers.34 These risks are further incremented if contracting 
authorities have a short term perspective of focusing on pure “best-value for money” (understood 
as price cuts) and overlook the competition consequences on market structures in a medium or 
long term. Due to the complexity of these issues we can only limit ourselves to present them in 
broad strokes with the intention of raising awareness to public procurement practitioners. 
A) Monopsony effect 
Monopsonistic buyer power poses the same risks for competition and market players as a 
monopoly does.35 Monopsony takes place whenever there is either a sole buyer for a specific 
product or one very large and dominant buyer that faces competition only from fringe buyers 
with no market power whatsoever. Thus, it has no competitive constraints from direct 
competitors. In any case, the monopsonist will exercise its market power to obtain extraordinary 
contracting conditions by reducing the amount of goods and/or services purchased36 from the 
seller to obtain a lower purchasing price.37 The monopsonist can be at any level of the 
                                                          
33 “(…) the aggregation and centralisation of purchases should be carefully monitored in order to avoid excessive 
concentration of purchasing power and collusion (…)”, rec (59) dir 2014/24 (emphasis added). See also below IV. 
34 For general discussion on the applicable economic framework, see SANCHEZ GRAELLS (2011: 33-73). 
35 For the description of the monopsony model see, inter alia: BERNHEIM and WHINSTON (2008: 648-652); 
FRANK and GLASS (1999: 503-508); PINDYCK and RUBINFELD (2009: 373-381); QUIRK (1987: 358-362); 
VARIAN (2006: 471-474). 
36 This conduct is named by SALOP (2004-2005: 672) as “underbuying”. “Monopsony conduct involves 
“underbuying” an input to profitably reduce its price”. AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW (2006: 442). 
37 A similar definition is provided by the OECD when stating: “A firm as monopsony power if its shares of 
purchases in the upstream input market is sufficiently large that it can cause the market price to fall by purchasing 
less and cause it to rise by purchasing more”. Note, however, how it is stressed the fact that monopsony under this 
definition can occur even if there is more than a single buyer in the market. OECD (2009: 9). This purchasing price 
needs to be below competitive levels in order for it to be considered as anticompetitive. See, for example the 
contribution of Canadian Competition Bureau as well as Germany’s contribution in OECD (2009: 142 and 176), 
respectively. See also GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER (2008: 517-518). 
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production chain38 but it is most likely to be found at an intermediate level, such as it is the case 
of central purchasing bodies.39 
Monopsony is always negative from a welfare perspective because too few resources are 
employed,40 and therefore there are unrealized gains from additional trade,41 as well as higher 
prices in the downstream market generating monopsonistic incomes to the powerful buyer.42 
Thus, monopsonists are inefficient buyers. 
Despite the fact that monopsony tends to be a rare phenomenon, public procurement markets 
tend to be scenarios where it might more often take place,43 Particularly in case of highly 
centralised procurement activities. This is the consequence of the state usually enjoying a 
monopoly or quasi monopoly position in the market as the provider of downstream services or 
goods for which public procurement is used (for example: health provision services; basic 
educational services; road construction; transportation networks; provision of sewage, etc). 
Further, by centralizing or aggregating purchases the number of buyers—and “intra”-contracting 
authority competition—is further restricted and the market power of the central purchasing body 
is strengthened.  
B) Abusive bargaining power 
As briefly discussed, bargaining power can generally have a positive welfare effect (above 
II.1.A). However, we submit that if a dominant buyer is also a dominant provider downstream, 
the exercise of bargaining power may have negative consequences for welfare.44 If the buyer is 
dominant in both markets it will not be constrained to pass on price benefits to end consumers in 
the form of lower purchasing prices or better quality/accessibility.45 In public procurement this 
can take place as contracting authorities usually have a monopoly or quasi monopoly prerogative 
in meeting needs in the public interest which are not of a commercial or industrial nature, thus 
facing little competition from private parties. Because of having such a privileged “gateway” 
position, contracting authorities can impose anticompetitive conditions in the tender 
documentation—in the form of take it or leave it contracts or very restrictive terms. Some 
suppliers will be forced to commit to them as otherwise they will have no access to the end 
customers, hurting competition in the short and the long term. Others, however, will rather exit 
the public procurement supply market and enter into other economic activity. Also, to pass on 
                                                          
38 JACOBSON and DORMAN (1991: 5). 
39 ABA (2012: 52). 
40 BLAIR and HARRISON (2010: 44). The same negative consequence is pointed out by the OECD (2009: 9). 
41 DOBSON et al. (1998: 12). 
42 OECD (2009: 9). Note, however, how higher prices in a downstream market will only occur in the case the buyer 
uses the acquired input to produce goods and/or services that will be later on sold or offered in a downstream 
market. In principle, no higher prices in a downstream market will be generated if the input is acquired for inner 
consumption. 
43 Monopsony power requires four main elements to exist, some of which are almost always present in public 
procurement markets. i) A large dominant buyer with a very high degree of market power; ii) few other buyers with 
little or no market power; iii) an upward slopping supply curve, which means that each additional purchase the 
monopsony makes increases the input prices of all the goods and/or services that has purchased before and thus, by 
cutting purchases it can decrease the price it pays; and iv) not sufficient countervailing supply market power. As a 
rule of thumb, the existence or lack thereof of monopsony power must be evaluated on a case-by case basis. 
44 CHEN (2007: 36). 
45 CMA (2007: para. 1.21); CHEN (2007: 36). 
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the benefits to consumers, central purchasing bodies must make sure that either: better quality, 
more quantity and wider accessibility of the services are provided to final consumers or that the 
cost for society for the provision of these services/goods is also reduced which arguably will 
imply that less tax-payer’s money is spent on public purchases. 
C) Market concentration and squeezing of SMEs 
Arguably, one the most debated issues concerning aggregated procurement is the tendency of 
concentrating markets both on the side of the suppliers and the buyers as recognized by the 
Directive 2014/24.46 Market concentration and small and medium enterprises (“SMEs”) leaving 
the market may be medium and long term consequences of aggregated procurement strategies, as 
larger but less frequent public contracts are entered into. By exercising unrestricted public buyer 
power—which is a conduct that a rational buyer would not engage in47—markets will see the 
number of its actors reduced because certain suppliers are forced to exit due to the lack of 
profitability and as a natural consequence of the increased competition.48 This effect of the 
aggregation of purchases appears to be in clear opposition to the promotion of SME’s 
participation in public procurement, one of the reasons behind the modernization of the rules, as 
they would be the most affected firms.49 
Three arguments ground this view. Firstly, public buyer power will impose demand side 
constraints over the competitive process lowering purchasing prices (arguably, a desirable effect) 
but also reducing the profitability of public contracts for economic operators. Secondly, as the 
contracts are infrequent but probably larger, participation from large suppliers will be very 
intense as these contracting operators cannot skip the opportunity to win a large and attractive 
contract.50 Thirdly, SMEs will arguably have fewer chances to win the more infrequent but larger 
contracts51  as they are unable to compete against larger suppliers due to economies of scale, 
manpower or simply not being able to satisfy minimum tender requirements.52 By forcing SMEs 
out of the market contracting authorities, unknowingly, are not only reducing competition but 
might also be likely to be infringing article 102 TFEU because of entering into exploitative 
                                                          
46 Rec (69) dir 2014/24. 
47 This is one of the underlying assumptions of bargaining models; that a profit-maximizing buyer would not behave 
irrationally by squeezing its suppliers to the extent that they will be forced to leave the market as it will be left 
without supply sources. However, microeconomic assumptions do not necessarily reflect the real world. 
48 The fact that inefficient suppliers are forced to leave the market should not be a concern and it is not in EU 
competition law as the ECJ has held in several occasions that competition law should not protect inefficient 
competitors. 
49 “(…) the public procurement rules adopted (…) should be revised and modernised in order to increase the 
efficiency of public spending, facilitating in particular the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) in public procurement” rec (2) dir 2014/24. For discussion of SMEs in EU public procurement law, see: 
BURGI (2007). 
50 This will, of course, depend on the application of rules on the subdivision of the contract in lots and the possibility 
to submit bundled offers including rebates in case of award of all or most of the tenderer lots. However, fully 
discussing these issues would exceed the possibilities of this chapter. 
51 Art 46 dir 2014/24. 
52 CHARD et al. (2008: NA28); see also: BURGI (2007: 290). 
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practices vis-à-vis its suppliers by, for example, offering unreasonably low purchasing prices or 
conditions.53 
Increased market concentration in public procurement markets is a serious problem because it 
reduces market players, competitive pressure and, consequently variety and alternative technical 
solutions.54 Additionally, by entering into large and lengthy agreements the contracting 
authorities become “locked in” with a supplier who, benefiting from the absence of supply-side 
competition will in the future exercise market power vis-à-vis public buyers and raise prices. It 
also may increase fierce oligopolistic-competition that can become tacit or express collusion, a 
topic which we deal with in the following sub-section.55 
D) Waterbed effect 
Part of the microeconomic literature suggests that due to techniques that foster the creation of 
buyer power, the prices paid by other buyers different from the one exercising buyer power will 
be higher.56 The intuition behind this waterbed or knock-off effect is simple: suppliers will try to 
recoup the lost profit by increasing the selling prices that non-powerful buyers will have to pay 
to acquire their input, and as competition has been reduced, sellers have more market power 
compared to smaller buyers.57  
In public procurement, this would imply that smaller contracting authorities, or those not having 
agreements with central purchasing bodies or part of other types of occasional joint procurement, 
will pay a higher wholesale price than those with public buyer power for the same goods or 
services.58 Paradoxically, smaller contracting authorities, for which public procurement tenders 
are already an economic and administrative heavy burden will see their purchasing prices 
increased. Consequently, the waterbed-effect is an incentive for this type of contracting 
authorities to employ aggregation techniques and increasing the risks generated by them—in a 
potentially vicious circle where contracting authorities can only try to avoid absorbing the 
negative impacts of contract aggregation and centralisation by furthering precisely those same 
techniques. 
However, despite the waterbed effect, overall purchasing prices could still be lower thanks to 
aggregation techniques as reductions in price for aggregated procurement are larger than the 
increase for other smaller buyers.59 The problem would, in that case, be ‘limited’ to an issue of 
cross-subsidisation between contracting authorities participating and not participating in 
                                                          
53 The abusive character of unfairly low purchase prices was raised in one instance (although not specifically in 
relation to public procurement procedures), but the ECJ dismissed the action on procedural grounds. See Case 
298/83 CICCE [1985] ECR 1105. Notably, the possibility that unfairly low purchase prices are considered abusive 
was not excluded as such by the EU judicature and, consequently, seems to remain as one of the potential conducts 
covered by art 102(a) TFEU. See below V, and also TREPTE (2001: 275-276). 
54 CHARD et al. (2008: NA29). 
55 Also of this opinion, ibid, NA32. 
56 DOBSON and INDERST (2007: 394). 
57 OECD (2009: 23); CMA (2004: para. 1.35). Cf with the view of who argue that despite the intuitive appeal this 
argument is not entirely satisfying in, DOBSON and INDERST (2008: 342). 
58 The same premium over competitive prices will be applicable (or even in a more significant proportion) to fringe 
non-public buyers that may acquire the same inputs for non-reserved downstream activities. 
59 OECD (2009: 23). 
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centralised procurement. Also, if smaller contracting authorities are able to implement 
“counterstrategies that eliminate or narrow any asymmetries of buying power” they may be able 
to get similar prices as those paid by contracting authorities employing aggregation techniques.60 
However, the likelihood of these counterstrategies seems limited if small or ‘independent’ 
contracting authorities are small and do not have access to highly qualified, professional 
purchasers. 
E) Lack of innovative and investment incentives 
The relation between aggregated procurement and innovation incentives is complex.61 Part of the 
literature argues that there is a negative side effect on investment and innovation generated by a 
short-term perspective when employing aggregated procurement .62 If contracting authorities 
have an overly strong focus on reduction of purchasing prices, suppliers might be unable to 
recoup their investment in R&D.63  
However, exercise of aggregated procurement techniques might have the reverse effect and may 
foster innovative ideas and create incentives for economic operators to invest, as demanded by 
Directive 2014/24 as “(p)ublic authorities should make the best strategic use of public 
procurement to spur innovation.”64 Innovation can be spurred for example by employing 
aggregated purchasing techniques encouraging procedures such as the innovation partnership,65 
allowing variant tenders,66 and increasing competition among suppliers for innovative products 
or services.67 
F) Bid rigging – collusion risk 
An important effect that aggregated procurement may have on competition in public 
procurement markets is increasing the incentive and opportunities for economic operators to 
enter into anticompetitive agreements or tacit collusion.68 This tactic known as bid rigging 
allows economic operators to coordinate their behaviour when bidding for the award of public 
contracts.69 By doing so, tenderers and not the contracting authority (or, rectius, a competitive 
process) determine themselves who and under what conditions should win the tender.70 Unlike 
the risks mentioned hitherto, the collusive behaviour is not directly carried out by contracting 
authorities. Instead, aggregated procurement incentivizes tenders to do so. 
                                                          
60 Also mentioning this possibility of spill-off of a positive effect, see: OECD (2009: 11); DOBSON and INDERST 
(2008: 353-354) call this effect the “anti-waterbed effect”. 
61 OECD (2009: 54). 
62 For literature supporting this argument, see inter alia: DOBSON and INDERST (2008:355); CMA (2007: paras. 
1.16 and 1.32); CHARD et al. (2008: NA29). 
63 CMA (2007: para. 1.32); OECD (2009: 11-12). 
64 Rec (47) dir 2014/24. 
65 Art 31 dir 2014/24. 
66 Art 45 dir 2014/24. 
67 Generally, see CERQUEIRA GOMES (2014). 
68 For discussion and further references, see SANCHEZ GRAELLS (2014a). 
69 Rec (59) dir 2014/24. 
70 OECD (2010: 9). 
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In our view aggregated purchasing fosters collusion – and does not prevent it - due to several 
reasons.71 Price signalling and tacit or explicit communication is facilitated as less frequent 
purchases are carried out by a single entity. This minimizes costs and efforts to try to determine 
purchasing patterns as by having a “one-stop shop” contracting authority it becomes easier to 
track purchases. Since the contracts are arguably larger and economic operators cannot afford 
being “left out” they will have larger incentives to coordinate their behaviour and take turns in a 
survival strategy.72 Although we do agree that incentives to cheat in large contracts are higher,73 
so will be the retaliation by other economic operators as the importance of winning such larger 
tenders is crucial. Also, as aggregated procurement increases market concentration, there will be 
fewer suppliers that need to coordinate their behaviour, thus creating further incentives to 
collude.74 
2. Administrative and legal risks 
Aggregation techniques may also cause administrative and legal problems in addition to pure 
economic efficiency issues. We identify four concerns generated by aggregated procurement: a) 
risk management; b) decrease of autonomy for contracting authorities; c) principal-agent 
problem; and d) budget allocation issues. 
A) Increase of complex and costly litigation 
Employment of aggregation techniques implies the adoption of structures and procedures that are 
prone to complex and lengthy litigation initiated by economic operators that were not awarded 
the public contract in dispute. This is in our view derived from three sources. Firstly, as contracts 
are less frequent and larger in value the incentives to litigate for tenderers will be higher as the 
stakes are higher. This implies that contracting authorities must have a very high degree of care 
as the slightest error in the procedure may incentivise economic operators to file claims seeking 
the annulment of the tender procedure or the contract award.  
Secondly, not only litigation risk is increased but also the complexity of that litigation, as not 
only the public sector professionalizes its procurement activities but the private sector continues 
to do so. Conflicts may tend to focus on small details or very technical issues. In turn, this overly 
complex litigation creates a burden for non-specialized judges who will have to deal with 
difficult issues. Thus, the risk of obtaining wrong decisions at a judicial level is also increased.  
Thirdly, due to the larger size and value of public contracts the economic consequences for 
contracting authorities derived from infringements of public procurement laws increases 
proportionally. Not only because claims for damages and fines will be larger, but also because 
remedies such as interim measures suspending procedures may imply that perhaps very large 
                                                          
71 Cf this with the opposite view that centralized purchasing may help prevent collusion: CHARD et al. (2008). 
72 Supporting this view on the incentives to collude due to large sizes of public contracts, OECD (2010: 24). 
73 CHARD et al. (2008: NA32). 
74 ESTEVAN DE QUESADA (2014: 232). 
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amounts of needed goods or services will not be timely and steadily procured until the litigation 
is finished.75  
B) Decrease of autonomy for contracting authorities 
Aggregated procurement techniques also imply de facto lessening contracting authorities’ 
autonomy. This is an issue that will have a much larger impact vis-à-vis smaller local or regional 
bodies and that can have very significant implications in terms of local and regional autonomy 
and, more generally, the administrative structure of the State. By entering into aggregated 
purchasing mechanisms, local contracting authorities transfer their decisional autonomy to a 
central body with the expectation of obtaining better prices when acquiring goods or services. 
Now, this central body will make the purchasing decision by either seeking consensus among the 
different contracting authorities taking part of the aggregated procurement or by simply making 
an arbitrary decision. Local or regional bodies might feel that their decision making powers have 
been removed from them or that their view has not been taken into account. This can lead to an 
increase in political clashes and administrative litigation between the contracting authorities, 
implicating further expenses. Also, by losing autonomy, local or regional contracting authorities 
have more difficult the implementation of tailor-made policies as the input they acquire tends to 
be standardized, as we explain in the section below. 
C) Principal-agent problem  
Aggregation of purchasing techniques may generate principal-agent effects, a well know-
economic dilemma.76 The agent, the entity carrying out the procurement operation, makes 
procurement decisions that are not directly controlled nor observed by the principal. In our case, 
the contracting authority using aggregation techniques through an intermediary or in an scenario 
of public-public occasional joint procurement cannot fully observe the behaviour undertaken by 
the central purchasing body or the prime contracting authority. If the goals or interest of the 
agent differ from those of the principal, then conflict of interest between the parties arises.77 The 
incentives for deciding which goods to buy may greatly vary between the agent and the principal 
and, as the decision ultimately lies on the agent, the action taken depends on the risk for the 
agent when contrasted with the benefits of obtaining the outcome that is in the best interest of the 
body carrying out the aggregated procurement.78 Also, another problem raised by the principal-
agent dilemma is that the latter may be very keen in cutting expenses and achieving operational 
efficiency but by doing this “threatens lost value (and increased risks, for example, of corruption) 
in the long run.”79 In public procurement procedures, this implies that aggregated purchasing 
may lead to the acquisition of standardized or homogenous goods that do not satisfy the specific 
needs of all contracting authorities part of the aggregation scheme, as the procurement conditions 
might not be very specific. In other words, securing apparent best value for money (or best valur 
for money for the agent) may not necessarily achieve customer satisfaction (ie satisfy in full the 
                                                          
75 This scenario appears to be quite unlikely because interim measures in all Member States must be evaluated 
against a proportionality test, but is not impossible for it to happen. 
76 For a thorough analysis of the principal agent problem in public procurement, in general, YUKINS (2010). 
77 Ibid, 64. 
78 GROSSMAN and HART (1983). 
79 YUKINS (2010: 73). 
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contracting authority for which the procurement is ultimately intended).80 If such is the case, then 
the quality of public services will be diminished as one size fits all does not really suit all 
situations nor it grants proper solutions to end users. 
In order to minimize the principal-agent problem, aggregation techniques ought to be under 
surveillance mechanisms of both economic operators and contracting authorities. Contracting 
authorities can apply monitoring and supervising strategies to make sure that their needs are as 
aligned as possible so that customer satisfaction is achieved. Economic operators will act as an 
indirect control whenever litigating precluded practices by the agents. Nevertheless, despite these 
supervision measures there will be a residual loss that cannot be completely eliminated but 
merely mitigated and should also be taken into account.81 And, in any case, the overall costs of 
the system may well be significantly increased due to this multiple layers of monitoring. 
D) Budget allocation issues and overbuying 
Lastly, the economic benefits obtained as a consequence of the purchasing buyer power or 
operational efficiency might be eroded due to overbuying of goods and budget allocation issues. 
Contracting authorities might feel the urge to reach the same level of expenditure as the previous 
year or to match the earmarked budget.82 They might fear that if they do not do so, then these 
funds will be taking away from them, particularly in times of economic crisis. Accordingly, 
contracting authorities might be tempted to overbuy goods or services to reach certain budget 
targets and, therefore, the efficiencies generated by means of aggregated purchasing are washed 
away in the purchase of unnecessary goods in the fear of a future reduction of the body’s 
budget.83 This can be particularly problematic if centralised purchasing bodies adopt independent 
purchasing decisions when they act as wholesalers for the public sector (below IV). In those 
cases, if CPBs simply try to achieve the maximum level of economies of scale, they may well 
end up being left with excessive stocks of unneeded products. This may either result in a pure 
economic loss and waste in public sector activities, or in a further attempt of the CPB to resell 
(even at a loss?) the products to non-public markets—which would trigger very significant 
competition enforcement issues (below V). Overall, the risk of over-procurement is significant 
and, in our view, gets exacerbated in case of aggregation or centralisation of procurement. 
IV. Tools for the aggregation of procurement in Directive 2014/24 
As previous sections have shown, it is hard to provide a clear cut answer on whether the net 
effects of centralisation of procurement are positive or negative, both in economic and in 
administrative terms. However, it is also clear that centralisation of procurement is a common 
trend in procurement modernisation in the Member States. In recognition of this general trend, 
and along the general lines of facilitating public-public cooperation,84 but in relation to 
                                                          
80 Ibid, 73-76. 
81 Ibid, 66. 
82 Also raising this issue, see RACCA (2010: 123). 
83 The rationale here appears to be that, at least in EU Member States where the crisis has had a larger impact on the 
public sector unspent resources are understood by legislators as non-needed funds and not as the result of efficient 
public procurement practices. 
84 Generally, on the functional alternatives, ALBANO and SPARRO (2010). For a general overview of the rules, see 
ARROWSMITH (2014: 373-377 and 535-540). 
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‘cooperate-to-buy’ decisions instrumented through either centralised procurement or occasional 
joint procurement,85 Directive 2014/24 regulates certain possibilities that go beyond the primitive 
rules on centralisation of purchases and the creation of central purchasing bodies contained in 
article 11 of Directive 2004/18.86 As the European Commission has stressed, the new Directive 
makes it easier for contracting authorities to bundle their purchases by using joint procurement 
procedures or purchasing through a central purchasing body.87 This can be done on a national or 
cross-border level.88 The justification for the increased detail in the regulation of centralised and 
collaborative procurement, 89 including cross-border cooperation, can be found in recitals (69) to 
(71) of Directive 2014/24, where the increasing relevance of these procurement techniques is 
echoed,90 and an interesting direct reference is made to the potential increase in competition that 
can derive from the use of these techniques (see above II for further discussion). However, it 
must be borne in mind that generally (and as pointed out above III), the centralisation of 
procurement activities creates significant risks of distortions of competition—which, as also 
already mentioned, is acknowledged in recital (59): ‘the aggregation and centralisation of 
purchases should be carefully monitored in order to avoid excessive concentration of purchasing 
power and collusion, and to preserve transparency and competition, as well as market access 
opportunities for SMEs’.91 Hence, this is an area where particular care should be exercised in 
trying to avoid distortions of competition. 
In that regard, it is important to stress that the rules of Directive 2014/24 deviate in significant 
ways from what would be desirable from a competition perspective. Central purchasing bodies 
are now clearly assigned two alternative (or, actually, possibly cumulative or parallel) roles 
under Directive 2014/24. As explained in recital (69) of Directive 2014/24, 
… it should be clarified that central purchasing bodies operate in two different manners. Firstly, 
they should be able to act as wholesalers by buying, stocking and reselling or, secondly, they 
should be able to act as intermediaries by awarding contracts, operating dynamic purchasing 
systems or concluding framework agreements to be used by contracting authorities. Such an 
intermediary role might in some cases be carried out by conducting the relevant award 
procedures autonomously, without detailed instructions from the contracting authorities 
concerned; in other cases, by conducting the relevant award procedures under the instructions of 
the contracting authorities concerned, on their behalf and for their account (emphasis added). 
Thus, on the one hand, central purchasing bodies can act in support or on behalf of contracting 
authorities (ie ‘act as intermediaries by awarding contracts, operating dynamic purchasing 
systems or concluding framework agreements to be used by contracting authorities’. Under this 
                                                          
85 On the situations in which recourse to this type of cooperation is desirable, see BAKKER et al. (2008). 
86 This provision received very limited attention from the ECJ, given that it was not applicable ratione temporis to 
the facts in Case C-220/05 Auroux [2007] ECR I-385, and it was not the object of the dispute in Case C-368/10 
Commission v Netherlands [2012] pub. electr. EU:C:2012:284. For discussion of certain practical difficulties, see 
RACCA (2010) in totum. 
87 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014). 
88 However, for the purposes of this paper, the distinction between internal or cross-border recourse to a central 
purchasing body will only be taken into consideration in terms of the magnitude of the likely effects on competition. 
The detailed rules on applicable law established in art 39 dir 2014/24 will not be assessed in detail. 
89 Generally, see RISVIG HAMER (2014: 207-210); and SANCHEZ GRAELLS (2014b). 
90 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014: 25-26), where it is clearly indicated that most Member States have 
implemented this option in their national legislation, with the exception of Estonia, Germany and Luxembourg. 
91 For discussion, see ALBANO (2014). 
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instrumental role, central purchasing bodies would be acting as agents of the public sector and 
their interface with competitive markets will be limited to their recourse to the market for the 
procurement of the goods, services (or works) ultimately needed by the contracting authorities 
‘downstream’. Hence, under the currently applicable rules, and particularly under the FENIN-
Selex exclusion from the concept of undertaking,92 ‘instrumental CPBs’ activities would not be 
controlled by competition law (with the exclusion of State aid rules). 
On the other hand, they can act as the actual providers of other contracting authorities (that is, 
‘act as wholesalers by buying, stocking and reselling’). Under this commercial role, central 
purchasing bodies would actually engage in an economic activity, as they would be assuming 
economic risk derived from any mismatch between the volumes they acquire and those they 
manage to supply to the contracting authorities downstream. This second role of ‘commercial 
CPBs’, which would engage in downstream economic activity in competition with ‘private 
suppliers’ (or other competing commercial CPBs), would no longer be exempted from the 
application of competition rules under the current criteria93—unless the ECJ extends the FENIN-
Selex exemption beyond its current remit, possibly on the basis of a justification more or less 
tailored to a configuration of CPB activity as a service of general economic interest (SGEI). 
However, in our view, the (even clearer) economic character of this sort of CPB activities should 
make them fall completely under the umbrella of competition law (see below V). 
Interestingly, there is a third (implicit or derivative) function for central purchasing bodies, 
which can be directly engaged by contracting authorities for the provision of ‘ancillary 
purchasing activities’94 and, possibly, remunerated for them. This would create a sort of 
(potentially free standing) ‘advisory CPBs’ activity which, in case it is remunerated, would also 
seem to represent an economic activity that should be subjected to competition rules. 
It is now clear that all of these roles are expressly regulated in article 37(1) of Directive 2014/24 
as far as instrumental and commercial activities are concerned (which suppresses any legal 
uncertainty derived from the silence of dir 2004/18), and art 37(4) as regards advisory or 
ancillary activities. It is also worth stressing that Member States can make the recourse to the 
central purchasing body mandatory (art 37(1) in fine dir 2014/24). This latter possibility creates 
very difficult to anticipate competition effects, as it makes the supply of the goods, works or 
services to the public sector depend on the running of a ‘two-sided’ platform by the central 
purchasing body. In that case, depending on the way in which demand is aggregated or bundled, 
the exclusionary effects on (particularly smaller) suppliers can be very relevant (above III.1.c). 
Moreover, generally, there seems to be no good reason to impose recourse to the central 
purchasing body if a given contracting authority can obtain better conditions (ie, better value for 
money) from an alternative provider. In that case, the principle of competition in article 18(1) of 
Directive 2014/24 would require carving out an exception from the rule of obligatory recourse to 
the central body when it is not the one offering the most economically advantageous tender 
(although, admittedly, this would create practical difficulties if the contracting authority just 
decides to rely on the central body without carrying out any independent market consultation, 
under art 40 dir 2014/24 or otherwise). 
                                                          
92 Case C-205/03 P FENIN v Commission [2006] ECR I-6295; and Case C-113/07 P Selex v Commission [2009] 
ECR I-2207. For discussion and criticism, see SANCHEZ GRAELLS (2009). 
93 SANCHEZ GRAELLS (2015: ch 4). 
94 As defined in art 2(1)(15) dir 2014/24. 
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According to the rules in article 37 of Directive 2014/24, recourse to a central purchasing body 
exempts the contracting authority from complying separately with public procurement rules (on 
the assumption, obviously and unavoidably, that the central purchasing body is the one bound by 
them in its market interactions), unless it directly carries out one or more of the phases involved 
in the procurement process (as indicated in art 37(2) dir 2014/24).95 Moreover, contracting 
authorities can award a public service contract for the provision of centralised purchasing 
activities to a central purchasing body without applying the procedures foreseen in Directive 
2014/24. Such public service contracts may also include the provision of ancillary purchasing 
activities, which as already mentioned implies that there can be an element of remuneration of 
this service.  
Therefore, recourse to central purchasing bodies is fundamentally excluded from the scope of 
application of Directive 2014/24 in a sort of special case allowing for the use of the negotiated 
procedure without publication (or by analogy with art 32 dir 2014/24, or even with art 12 dir 
2014/24, as the logic and functional rules applicable to in-house provision and public-public 
cooperation seem rather common), which however has a dubious justification, particularly if the 
centralised purchasing body is a body governed by public law with private capital participation.96 
Under the rules of Directive 2014/24, centralisation of procurement is seen as a clear device to 
allow (small) contracting authorities to achieve savings,97 as well as higher standards of 
professionalization,98 and to reduce the administrative burden of running procurement 
procedures by having recourse to the services of the central purchasing body—in a sort of 
intermediate solution between a public-public cooperation scheme (for which there would clearly 
not be a sufficient cooperative element) and an in-house arrangement (for which the control 
criterion would probably be absent).99 From the competition perspective, this possibility 
basically moves the focus of the competition concerns to the market activities of the central 
purchasing body and increases the likelihood of distortions of competition, and it may as well 
result in the central purchasing body engaging in a sort of ‘market regulation’ activity that is 
difficult to align with the general requirements of the principle of competition. Consequently, it 
is a development that causes significant source for concern in terms of the development of a pro-
competitive public procurement system. 
Along the same lines, article 38 of Directive 2014/24 sets rules for the carrying out of occasional 
joint procurement and article 39 of Directive 2014/24 extends the possibility to have recourse to 
centralised or occasional joint procurement involving contracting authorities from different 
Member States. These rules aim at settling important legal issues concerning the applicable law 
and, from a competition perspective, the only provision that is worth mentioning is that article 
39(2) establishes that Member States ‘shall not prohibit its contracting authorities from using 
centralised purchasing activities offered by central purchasing bodies located in another 
Member State’. This could create a certain level of competition between centralised purchasing 
bodies that could in turn reduce the likelihood of distortions of competition even if their use was 
made compulsory. However, in a difficult to understand restriction, this same provision allows 
                                                          
95 RISVIG HAMER (2014). 
96 Generally, see ØLYKKE and FANØE ANDERSEN (2015). 
97 See KARJALAINEN (2011). 
98 However, recourse to centralised procurement does not eliminate the need for proper (decentralised) contract 
management. See ALBANO and ZAMPINO (2012); and RACCA et al. (2010). 
99 For extensive discussion, see SANCHEZ GRAELLS (2015: ch 6). 
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Member States to limit the possibility of having access to ‘foreign’ central purchasing bodies that 
act as wholesalers or as intermediaries—ie from having access to ‘commercial CPBs’. That is, a 
given Member State can decide to allow its contracting authorities to use the services of ‘foreign’ 
central purchasing bodies acting as wholesalers, but not of those acting as intermediaries—or 
viceversa. This is a provision that is difficult to understand if not on the basis of the (likely) 
constitutional restrictions that some Member States may want to impose on the first possibility 
(ie, on the possibility of central purchasing bodies acting as wholesalers in competition with 
private undertakings or, even more, on the basis of a reserve of activity amounting to a 
monopoly), which they would also be keen on extending beyond their borders. In any case, 
however, from a competition law perspective, it seems desirable to subject all decisions based on 
articles 37 to 39 of Directive 2014/24, and 37 especially, to a proportionality test that balances 
out the expected benefits in terms of reduction in administrative costs and exploitation of 
economies of scale against the likely distortions of competition in the market where the central 
purchasing bodies are active (see above II and III). It is further submitted that, in that assessment, 
the relevance of the latter distortions should be highlighted as a way of providing effectiveness to 
the principle of competition embedded in article 18(1) of Directive 2014/24. Moreover, 
depending on the circumstances, the reservation of the activity to the central purchasing body 
could amount to State aid, which could be difficult to justify on the basis of a potentially non-
existing service of general economic interest (SGEI). Therefore, from a competition perspective, 
the implementation of article 37 of Directive 2014/24 creates significant risks that will deserve 
careful consideration by the ECJ in the future. 
V. Justification of certain activities permitted by the 2014 rules and 
critical assessment of their competitive impact 
From the cursory analysis carried out in the previous section, there are two issues that stand out 
and, in our view, are likely to create significant competition problems and litigation in the future. 
One of them is the temptation of Member State to declare the activities of the central purchasing 
body a service of general economic interest (SGEI) and, consequently, seek an exemption from 
the application of competition and State aid rules under article 106(2) TFEU. The second one, 
which may or may not be linked to such an intended exemption, concerns the possibility for 
‘commercial CPBs’ or ‘advisory CPBs’ to supply goods or provide services to private buyers in 
the market. We will assess each of these possibilities in the remainder of this paper. 
1. Can the provision of centralised purchasing activities be defined as an SGEI? 
Generally speaking, under article 14 TFEU, Member States retain discretion to define, 
commission and provide SGEIs, but then they have to comply with EU law rules under article 
106(2) TFEU.100 Thus, in the event that the central purchasing body was considered to be 
entrusted with the operation of ‘services of general economic interest’101, articles 14 and 106(2) 
TFEU will empower the state to relax the regulation of its activities and to allow for certain 
competition-restricting behaviour (ie, to enact regulation that departs from general EU law and, 
                                                          
100 Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751 at para 104; and Case T-106/95 FFSA and Others v Commission [1997] 
ECR II-229 at para 137. 
101 On the concept of services of general economic interest, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2007). Also 
SZYSZCZAK, (2001); and NEERGAARD (2009: 211 and ff). 
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notably, from the competition rules of the TFEU), as long as it is necessary for the performance, 
in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to the public contractor.102 Along these lines, 
article 106(2) TFEU could arguably be used as the legal basis to exclude the application of EU 
competition rules in connection with the ‘commercial’ or ‘advisory’ activities of central 
purchasing bodies entrusted with the provision of centralised purchasing activities as an SGEI. If 
successful, under this strategy article 106(2) TFEU would justify the conduct of competition-
distorting public procurement by the Member States. It is important to stress that the 2014 
procurement Directives highlight the fact that their existence and enforcement do 
not affect the freedom of Member States to define, in conformity with Union law, what they 
consider to be services of general economic interest, how those services should be organised and 
financed, in compliance with the State aid rules, and what specific obligations they should be 
subject to. Equally [they do] not affect the decision of public authorities whether, how and to 
what extent they wish to perform public functions themselves pursuant to Article 14 TFEU and 
Protocol No 26 (art 1(4) dir 2014/24 and art 4 dir 2014/23). 
Overall, though , our opinion is that the ‘public service exemption’ under article 106(2)TFEU is 
not available to the exclusion of centralised purchasing activities from competition law scrutiny 
on the basis that they are (or can be) considered a service of general economic interest (SGEI). 
Indeed, the proper interpretation of these provisions must rely on the case law of the EU 
judicature that has set the conditions required to avoid the use of the ‘public mission exception’ 
in article 106(2) TFEU to subvert the basic principles that inspire the EU public procurement 
rules. The basis for such an interpretation is straightforward. The proper performance of the tasks 
entrusted to the public sector generally does not require a departure from the basic principles of 
the TFEU and public procurement rules. In the specific case of the exemption as an SGEI of 
centralised purchasing activities, the limitation that Member States should be unable to overcome 
is that there is no market failure that requires central purchasing bodies to be exempted from 
competition rules. It is clear that the private sector is able and willing to supply the public sector 
with goods and services and, even with the creation of SGEI-covered central purchasing bodies, 
the ultimate suppliers of the public sector would continue being the same suppliers (or, possibly, 
some of them, given the exclusionary effects that centralisation can create). Moreover, there are 
less restrictive ways in which central purchasing bodies can carry out their mission (ie 
‘intermediary’ CPB activity), which would not support an assessment of proportionality in the 
application of the article 106(2) TFEU exemption to the alternative and market-oriented options 
(ie ‘commercial’ and ‘advisory’ CBP activity). Additionally, in case the CPBs did not have the 
capacity to meet all existing demand for centralised purchasing services (and this should be seen 
as a more than theoretical risk, due to funding and other constraints), the justification for the 
reservation of the activity as an SGEI would also fall foul of the existing case law on the 
interaction between article 106(2) and 102 TFEU.103 Finally, and contrary to the purpose of 
article 106(2) TFEU, the exemption of CPB commercial and advisory activities from 
competition law scrutiny would be a significant source of potential distortions of competition, 
would significantly jeopardise the principle of competitive neutrality and could ultimately result 
in significant losses of social welfare (above III). 
                                                          
102 On the scope of the so-called ‘public mission exception’, see BUENDÍA SIERRA (1999: 271-360). See also 
Moral Soriano (2003); contra see BAQUERO CRUZ (2005: 209 and 212). The applicability of art 106(2) TFEU can 
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It is also worth mentioning that, due to the possibility of entrusting central purchasing bodies 
with the carrying out of centralised purchasing activities and ancillary purchasing activities (even 
for remuneration) by direct award under article 37(4) of Directive 2014/24, the impossibility of 
having recourse to article 106(2) TFEU would also immediately trigger the enforcement of State 
aid rules under article 107(1) TFEU due to the (practical) impossibility of meeting the fourth 
Altmark condition in the absence of a procurement exercise.104 
2. Can ‘commercial CPBs’ and ‘advisory CPBs’ engage with private buyers? 
Finally, it is worth highlighting that, under the rules in articles 37 and 39 of Directive 2014/24, 
there seems to be no obstacle for a central purchasing body engaged in commercial and advisory 
activities to offer its services and supplies to purchasers outside the public sector. This could 
either be attempted as a general strategy to achieve even larger economies of scale than 
warranted by the aggregation of public demand, or as a ‘minimisation’ strategy in cases of over-
acquisition by the public sector (above III.2.d). In this regard, a systematic interpretation of these 
provisions together with article 12 of Directive 2014/24—which regulates analogous situations 
of ‘public offer’ of goods and services in the context of public-public cooperation and in-house 
provision—could suggest that offering such supplies and services for an equivalent of up to 20% 
of the total turnover of the central purchasing body would not be necessarily out of line with the 
general criteria governing these sort of ‘out-of-market’ arrangements. 
In our view, in case Member States decided to authorise provision of centralised commercial and 
advisory activities to non-public purchasers, competition rules would be automatically triggered 
and CPBs’ behaviour should be intensely screened to avoid distortions of competition. The main 
sources of potential distortions would be leveraging of their possibly dominant positions, cross-
subsidies that allowed them to engage in predatory behaviour and other unfair commercial 
practices. Most of them would be covered by Article 102 TFEU and, according to Article 3(2) of 
Regulation 1/2003,105 Member States could enforce even stricter standards under their domestic 
provisions. For all the reasons indicated above, we submit that they should do so. 
VI. Towards a “Regional or even European Central Purchasing 
Body”? Or, at least, a “European Network of CPBs”? 
Further to the discussion above, and from a more holistic perspective, we are concerned that the 
combined application of the rules in the new Directive can result in scenarios where competition 
in public procurement can be significantly affected as a result of excessive (and improperly 
managed) centralisation of purchases. Indeed, EU public procurement developments and the 
success of aggregation techniques, in particular central purchasing bodies and framework 
agreements, appear to be paving the way for the creation of regional central purchasing bodies 
wherein inter-Member State procurement is carried out a by a regional central purchasing body. 
If this trend towards aggregation and centralization or purchases continues it is indeed possible to 
foresee that certain sectors in the EU may advocate for the creation of European (sectoral?) 
                                                          
104 C-280/00 Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg [2003] I-7747. SANCHEZ GRAELLS (2012c). 
105 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1. 
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central purchasing bodies that will carry out the procurements for all Member States based on the 
idea of grouping public buyer power and reducing administrative expenditures. 
Already, the Directive 2014/24 appears to be moving towards such direction as one of the new 
aspects introduced regarding central purchasing bodies is that it precludes Member States from 
prohibiting its contracting authorities from “using centralised purchasing activities offered by 
central purchasing bodies located in another Member State.”106 Despite the Directive clarifying 
that public procurement shall be carried out in accordance to the laws of the Member State of the 
central purchasing body, it leaves important questions unanswered, such as: which law will 
govern the contracting authority-central purchasing body relationship? Is this to be left to the 
application of rules on conflicts of laws? May this be the cause of increased inter-Member State 
litigation before EU Courts? Will further centralization lead to European-wide one size fits all 
solutions that, although cheaper, do not properly satisfy the needs of European taxpayers? 
Furthermore, by setting regional or in a perhaps not so distant future of a hypothetical network of 
European central purchasing bodies, the benefits resulting from aggregation are possibly 
increased but also, and to a worryingly degree, the inherent risks to purchasing aggregation 
techniques. Moreover, at some point, the central purchasing scheme could be ‘too big to be 
regulated’ due to political pressures. Thus, in our view, an increasing tendency for European-
wide centralization is a legitimate source of concern for the well-being of European competition 
within public procurement markets and market competition in general. The only 
recommendation that can be made at this early stage, where the creation of such network of 
CPBs may seem delusional to some, is to apply standard competition rules. Some interesting 
guiding principles can be found in the more general criteria applicable to the accumulation of 
buying power (above III), or to the treatment of networks of national entities with legal 
monopolies and cooperation or mutual recognition schemes.107 Other than that, guidance from 
the European Commission on the enforcement and interpretation of articles 37 to 39 of Directive 
2014/24 from a competition law perspective would be welcome, particularly if it is preceded by a 
transparent public consultation. 
VII. Conclusion 
This paper has adopted an economic and cost-benefit approach to the exploration of the benefits 
and risks that centralised public procurement techniques can generate, with a particular focus on 
the activities of central purchasing bodies. It has then briefly explored the new rules included in 
articles 37 to 39 of Directive 2014/24 and has stressed that most of the relatively new functions 
that the Directives permit for CPBs should and must be subjected to strict competition law 
enforcement. More specifically, it has dismantled the idea that most CPB activity can be 
considered a service of general economic interest (SGEI) and, consequently, rejected the 
possibility of exempting CPBs from the application of EU competition law on the basis of article 
106(2) TFEU. It has also flagged up two sources of particular concern, such as the engagement 
of CPBs with private purchasers and the potential excessive centralisation if recourse to cross-
border centralised public procurement is not restricted and subjected to the appropriate 
competition controls. We plan to explore some of these issues in further detail in future papers. 
                                                          
106 Art 39(2) dir 2014/24. 
107 Generally, see Case T-442/08 CISAC v Commission [2013] pub. electr. EU:T:2013:188. 
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